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Abstract 
This paper introduces and discusses the research proposition of a link between the 
modelling of critical infrastructure system/s and risk identification and management. 
As a means of categorically identifying points of risk within a particular model of a 
critical infrastructure system/s for the purpose of solution creation and contingency 
development and testing in the modelling environment, prior to physical 
implementation. This research is at the preliminary stage of exploration and is an 
extension of current research into modelling critical infrastructure system/s and 
extends this research with regard to introducing risk perception and quantifying risk, 
along with establishing modelling guidelines for consistent model generation, as 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The essential services supplied to modem society by critical infrastructure systems 
are many and varied and traverse numerous sectors of society to reach a large 
number of diverse consumers. As a consequence of the high supply reliability of 
these systems, the delivery and availability of these services are predominately, taken 
for granted. For instance, when operating the light switch it is expect that the 
electricity will be available to energise the light globe and illuminate the room, but is 
there any contingency consideration given if this was not the case? For the most part, 
consumers expect these services to be there when needed and are not overly 
concerned with the threats and vulnerabilities that can put these systems at risk. Nor 
are they concerned with the potential inconvenience or the impact magnitude that 
losing any, some or all these services can potentially impose upon most facets of 
society's everyday function. 
The consequence of society's reliance on critical infrastructure availability, 
technologies and the physical infrastructure supporting the delivery of their services, 
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necessitates the existence of a level of security to protect the availability and 
integrity of critical infrastructure systems. To achieve this requires identifying threat 
issues, the proactive mitigation of known risks, identifying new risks to prepare, 
develop and implement appropriate contingency plans. However, due to the diverse 
types of critical infrastructure, its physical size and scale, the management of security 
and identification of risks within the systems remains a difficult task. 
One way to directly address these issues is to generate a model of targeted critical 
infrastructure system featuring its normal operation and use the model as a means of 
assessing the functional integrity and security of the system. This process would 
enable: an in-depth and scalable system security analysis of the system model; a 
broadening of system understanding, and provide a valuable tool and inexpensive 
means of identifying points of risk within the subject critical infrastructure system/so 
Therefore, with the advent of critical infrastructure modelling, the identification of 
risk and the subsequent solution creation to counter the risk are potentially testable 
with the incorporation of the solution back into the system model. This then 
encourages further assessment to theorise upon the various causal factors that are 
likely to impact upon system availability, integrity of security and deviations from 
the functional norm. Furthermore, this would lead to more accurate risk 
identification reflecting a common point of understanding and perspective, which 
would enable clear communication of the risk to the public, critical infrastructure 
owners, operators, governments and other stakeholders regarding system threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks. 
Initially, this paper will briefly outline critical infrastructure from an Australian 
perspective and its system related characteristics to establish background knowledge, 
before proceeding to discuss the perception of risk in relation to critical 
infrastructures, its context and potential magnitude, along with discussing the various 
types of perceived risk. Next, is discussion that describes the potential that systems 
modelling offers, before going on to outline some fundamental guidelines applicable 
to modelling critical infrastructure systems to establish a guide for consistent model 
development. Finally, the conclusion will address and summarise the key research 
points identified to this time and any future research possibilities regarding the use of 
systems modelling as a means to enhance risk identification within critical 
infrastructure systems that may prove beneficial to key stakeholders. 
2. Characteristics of Critical Infrastructure 
In the Australian context, as with other technology-rich western societies, critical 
infrastructure systems deliver essential services across many differing sectors of the 
nation. Typically, critical infrastructure refers to those 'physical facilities, supply 
chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, 
degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period of time, would significantly 
impact upon the social or economic well-being of the nation or affect Australia's 
ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security' (AGD 2004 pI). 
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Therefore, the loss or interruption of critical infrastructure services would impact 
upon the normal functionality of the banking and finance sector, transport and 
distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply, communications, government 
services and national icons, as identified in the Australian government's national 
strategy (TISN 2004). 
As society is ever more dependant on these services, this reliance necessitates the 
protection of such systems to maintain service availability, this requires a 
fundamental understanding of what characterises critical infrastructure systems. The 
principal characteristic of these critical infrastructures is that they are systems 
consisting of numerous sub-systems, all functioning seamlessly and cooperatively as 
one larger system to deliver their services. Additionally, they can also the existence 
with interconnections between seemingly autonomous critical infrastructure systems. 
The existence of these interconnections results in the formation of dependency 
relationships, where one critical infrastructure system can deliver or exchange 
services with another critical infrastructure system, which adds further complexity to 
the network structure of the critical infrastructure system as a whole (Pye and 
Warren 2006). 
Therefore, critical infrastructure systems can be characterised as being complex, 
highly structured systems, interconnected with other highly cooperative networks to 
facilitate the supply of services. Scott (2005) noted this is particularly prevalent in 
the energy sector where the continuity of the electricity supply is essential to 
functionality of other critical infrastructures and their continued supply of services, 
particularly from the perspective of the national interest, business and social 
communities. 
When considered from this perspective, the primary objective is maintaining 
infrastructure availability and the continued provision of critical infrastructure 
services to the community across all sectors (Pye and Warren 2005). However, the 
risks become apparent when considering that by their very nature critical 
infrastructure systems are vulnerable to damage, destruction, disruption, breakdowns, 
negligence, natural disasters, cyber incidents, illegal and criminal activity, vandalism 
and malicious damage (Pye and Warren 2006). The presumption that critical 
infrastructure services will always be readily available and there on demand is an 
expectation drawn from past experience where these services have nearly always 
remained available or have only been disrupted for relatively short intervals. This is 
particularly apparent when considering services such as electricity, information 
technology and telecommunications that have always maintained high levels of 
service availability. 
The consequence of societal expectation is that critical infrastructure systems will 
always be available to deliver their services; therefore security of supply becomes a 
very important issue for owners, operators and users of critical infrastructure 
services. This means that they must identify their specific risk exposure at all levels, 
including sectors and sub-sectors of critical infrastructure such as depicted by Pye 
and Warren's (2005) overarching model of Australia's critical infrastructure. Hence 
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this research asserts that the use of targeted system modelling techniques would 
enable improved and faster identification of risk points, security threats and areas of 
vulnerability within the particular system's model. Thus enabling the development 
and testing of contingency plans in the model environment prior to physical 
implementation as a means to scope the impact of critical infrastructure service loss 
and engender a deeper appreciation of the risks to system security and availability. 
3. A Perception of Critical Infrastructure Risk 
It is apparent that some organisations within Australia utilising critical infrastructure 
services do not wholly understand where their particular organisation or 
infrastructure actually fits within the larger system arrangement of the wider critical 
infrastructure. Nor are they particularly self-aware of their own status or fully 
appreciate their potential obligations to the ongoing normal function and availability 
of the wider critical infrastructure system and its services (Pye and Warren 2006a). 
For example, in the 2004 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey 
participants were asked, 'Do you consider your organisation to be part of the critical 
national infrastructure?' (AusCERT 2004 p.5). This question focused on the National 
Information Infrastructure (NIl) as a subset of critical infrastructure and related 
directly to the 'infrastructure which comprises the electronic systems that underpin 
critical services such as telecommunications, transport and distribution, energy and 
utilities, and banking and finance' (TISN 2004a pI). What was notable about the 
response was that of the total respondents, 84 (35%) considered that their 
organisation was part of the critical NIl, while 123 respondents (51 %) did not and 
most significantly was that the remaining (equating to 14%) respondent organisations 
were unsure or unaware oftheir status with regard to their criticality and the NIL 
Subsequently, the same question was again put in the 2005 Australian Computer 
Crime and Security Survey; here 32% of the total respondents considered their 
organisation to be part of the critical NIl, while 52% believed their organisation as 
not part of the critical NIl. Significantly, in the 2004 survey, 14% of respondents 
were not sure of their actual positioning or status concerning the NIl infrastructure 
and this level of uncertainty had increased to 16% of respondents in the 2005 survey 
(AusCERT 2005). 
In retrospect the increase in the number of organisations uncertain of their status in 
relation to NIl critical infrastructure system highlights a disconcerting point that a 
significant number of organisations questioned in these surveys, did not necessarily 
appreciate or fully understand or were just not aware of their status within the NIl 
system. This indicates a lack of risk liability awareness of these organisations within 
the NIl critical infrastructure that could potentially and adversely impact service 
availability and functional security of other interconnected and dependent critical 
infrastructure systems (Pye & Warren 2006a). 
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This exemplifies a lack of circumstantial awareness and risk perception on the part of 
some organisations utilising a critical infrastructure system, whether this is a lack of 
understanding, education or awareness is unclear. Hence, this is where system 
modelling would clearly indicate where an organisation's own infrastructure fits 
within the schema of neighbouring or overall critical infrastructure system. Such 
modelling would enable organisations to undertake meaningful security and risk 
analysis to categorically determine an organisation's position, status, vulnerabilities 
and perhaps more importantly realise their infrastructure service availability and 
supply obligations to other interconnected and neighbouring critical infrastructure 
systems. 
Therefore, this suggests that through applying systems modelling techniques, an 
organisation would be able to undertake further analysis to identify their own points 
of vulnerability within the scope of their own systems. The next step would be to 
extrapolate further through modelling, to see how these risks could potentially 
impact upon the organisation's own infrastructure and that of the wider critical 
infrastructure system itself. Thus, elaborating, identifying and comprehending the 
implications of identified risks through modelling will enable further action to 
categorise communicate and prioritise risk management for contingency plan 
development and implementation. 
4. A Context of Risk 
While there is an element of risk associated with any undertaking, the risk itself not 
only relates to the recognition of the specific threat or vulnerability, but also to 
determining a rating of the degree of each risk. This would involve apportioning a 
value or rating to each risk determining its potential to cause a deviation from normal 
function. 
The awareness and subsequent management of risk involves identifying points of 
weakness within the system and determining to what extent an identified risk is 
acceptable and manageable. Assessing and rating the risk reflects a balance between 
opportunities for gains made, while minimising the potential for loss from an 
organisational perspective. Risk in this context is concerned with the impact and 
exposure to consequences of uncertainty or deviation from normal or expected 
function (Standards Australia 2004). 
4.1 Risk and Critical Infrastructure Modelling 
The modelling of a critical infrastructure system/s is an effective means of gaining an 
overview understanding and appreciation of system positioning and potential real-
world influence within the larger critical infrastructure structure network. Of course 
there are other issues of system scalability, the variable dynamics within the system 
and supporting sub-systems along with the dependency relationships with other 
cooperating critical infrastructure systems; however these issues are presently 
outside the scope to this paper. 
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The primary consideration is to highlight the potential for risk identification through 
applying systems modelling techniques to targeted critical infrastructure system/so 
The propose of this is that the modelling of critical infrastructure systems can further 
enhance risk detection and as a consequence, improve risk perception, appreciation 
and understanding across all sectors of critical infrastructure users, owners and 
operators to develop a common understanding of the degree of risk identified. 
4.2 Degree of Risk? 
The degree of risk itself incorporates a number of differing variables that when 
considered together can equate to a derived value of magnitude in relation to an 
individual risk being the possible cause of a hazardous or otherwise event occurring. 
Geoscience Australia (2004) applies the following risk formula to determine the 
degree or level of risk and likewise it can apply to critical infrastructure risk 
assessment where: 
RISK = Hazard * Elements at Risk * Vulnerability. 
This formula calculates the level of risk of an event occurring that depends on the 
magnitude of the hazard multiplied by identified number of elements at risk and the 
product of their vulnerability or susceptibility to damage or change. 
This rudimentary formula provides an example of how to weight identified risk 
vulnerabilities within the model of a targeted critical infrastructure system and thus 
quantify potential risk differences within the jurisdiction of the model. Then by 
extrapolating this weighting value back to the actual physical infrastructure system 
itself, this enables risk prioritisation, investigation, analysis and communication to 
relevant stakeholders, together with solution development priorities to mitigate the 
risk. Additionally, any risk mitigation solutions implemented back into the critical 
infrastructure model, delivers a means of hypothesising the solution's potential 
effectiveness to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level. 
As it stands currently, the quantifying of identified risks is an aside to this paper and 
will be the subject of ongoing and detailed research, but it does deliver a means of 
quantifying comparative risks for risk prioritisation within the model environment. 
However, this brief investigation does provide a starting point into its application and 
will assist in determining a common understanding regarding potential risk 
magnitude within the physical system. This would form part of the overall system 
analysis process as applied to the security and risk analysis of critical infrastructure 
system models. 
4.3 Perceptions of Risk 
In the context of modelling critical infrastructure and identifying points of risk, the 
perception of the risk itself varies depending on the perspective of those considering 
the risk. For instance the research of Gardner and Gould (1989) noted some common 
phraseology that describes technological risk from differing perspectives. For 
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example, the phase 'speaking different languages' referred to the different risk 
definitions applied by scientific community and the general public and what 
constitutes a 'socially acceptable' technology. This reflects the difference in values 
and philosophies regarding risk as most professional risk managers, engineers, 
scientists and experts tend to express risk quantitatively in terms of money lost. 
While, the general public is more inclined to regard risk qualitatively in terms of who 
is impacted and the acceptability of risk from a societal perspective rather then 
assigning a cost that is acceptable. 
In between these two broad groups is the government who must determine national 
policies, expenditure and resources on risk mitigation from a national perspective. 
Sjoberg (2001) notes that while this is part of the democratic process it is not perfect, 
sometimes decisions on risk policy and resource distribution means that not all 
stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome. Similarly from the Australian 
perspective, in response to the high levels of private ownership of critical 
infrastructure, the government initiated the Trusted Information Sharing Network 
(TISN) as a committee structure for managing, coordinating and sharing of restricted 
security information with infrastructure owners and operators. This also provides a 
means of managing risk in the national interest to deliver credible information (AGD 
2004a), but this process has some drawbacks too. 
The crux of this style of risk perception management is the gathering of credible 
information from a number of sources for consideration to determine a consensus 
viewpoint or single risk perception. However, in reality depending on one's 
circumstance this can potentially lead to differing interpretations and 
misunderstandings of the magnitude of the risks identified and communicated. In 
view of this situation the development of a consensus or single view of perceived 
riskls is imperative to the overall management of security and risk in the critical 
infrastructure system/so 
Therefore, the modelling of critical infrastructure systems provides a potential 
avenue for determining, identifying and investigating the risks inherent in critical 
infrastructure systems and a means to develop a recognised point of reference for 
acceptable understanding and magnitude of the risk. The potential benefit to risk 
management and detection that modelling brings is that it enables clients to see 
where the risk exists within their critical infrastructure systems, the analysis of risk, 
its assessment and the contingency plans developed to negate the potential effects if 
the risk comes to fruition. This is why modelling should be an integral part of any 
security or risk analysis process of critical infrastructure systems because the use of 
models in the discipline of information systems bodes well both as a user-analyst 
communication tool and is a well recognised means of communicating common 
understandings and conceptual ideas related to real-world systems. 
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5. Why Modelling? 
The primary aim of modelling a critical infrastructure system is to give the viewer a 
perspective of not only the external environment, but the internal characteristics of 
the system's environment and to map the targeted system boundaries to visualise its 
place within these surroundings. From this the modeller can begin to see and 
understand what influences contribute to characterising the functioning systems and 
its potential interactions and connections with neighbouring systems, thereby 
developing an appreciation of the system's status within the greater critical 
infrastructure schema (Pye & Warren 2006). 
Maani & Cavana (2000) suggest that in order to fully comprehend the functional 
behaviour of any system, at any level, that modelling the system is the easiest 
method to generate an overview of the system and its points of connection and 
interactions. Modelling enables the analyst to cope with system complexity, 
scalability, understand the system structure, the interaction points between the 
system components and sub-systems, the relational influences with other 
neighbouring systems and theorise about potential system responses. 
From this modelling perspective the system is essentially one that exhibits change 
and is dynamic in nature and thereby under the influence of 'cause and effect '. With 
this in mind the modeller can being to manipulate the model to theorise how the 
actual system could potentially react to similar changes made in the physical system 
itself. Likewise, this principle behaviour is also a characteristic of critical 
infrastructure systems that also exhibit dynamic behaviour, thus enabling the analyst 
to model such systems to theorise and predict the potential system responses to 
change. Thereby enabling by extension the opportunity through 'cause and effect' 
principles, to apply and model various 'what if' scenarios. Additionally, such system 
modelling enhances the ability to also identify points of risk within the model that 
are likely to be evident within the physical system itself (Pye & Warren 2006). 
Therefore, it is important to consider that the modelling process applied to critical 
infrastructure systems remains consistent to deliver a fair and equitable approach to 
modelling the target system and for the determination of security and risk points 
within the system. Underpinning this approach is the requirement to adopt a 
consistent approach to the model development thus requiring the application of 
fundamental guidelines with regard to the consistent development of critical 
infrastructure models. 
6. General Fundamentals of Modelling 
The overarching principle applied to critical infrastructure modelling should 
incorporate a keep it simple approach for the development of such system models. 
This is important because of the highly complex nature of critical infrastructure 
systems, and yet the endpoint model must also remain representative of the subject 
system to enable risk points within the system to become visible. To achieve this and 
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yet remain consistent in application, the following fundamental modelling principles 
represent an attempt to focus on the consistent application of modelling techniques as 
applied to critical infrastructure systems. 
The research of Pidd (1996) developed five desirable and simple principles to apply 
to the development of discrete computer simulations or in the use of programming 
language, similarly these same principles can also be adapted and utilised as guides 
to the development of critical infrastructure models, as follows (Pidd 1996): 
1. Model Simple, Think Complicated. 
This identifies that the modeller must keep in mind that the model itself is a 
tool to support and extend the thinking, impressions and conceptional 
understanding of the physical system as a model. Therefore the avoidance 
of additional complexity and need for clear physical system boundaries are 
established for the subject system model. 
2. Be Parsimonious, Start Simple and Add. 
The problem with the previous principle is identifying where the balance 
lies between simplicity and complexity. There is no general answer to this 
problem, but a solution lays in adopting a prototyping approach' where the 
gradual development of the model starts out with simple assumptions and 
by only adding further complexity as it become necessary. However this 
does require continued refinement and revision in order to avoid adding 
anything unnecessary to the model. 
3. Divide and Conquer, Avoid Mega-models. 
This is common advice given to those dealing with a complex problem, the 
aim being to breakdown the problem or in this case, decomposition the 
system into manageable component parts that applies the previous principle 
to develop the system model. 
4. Do Not Fall in Love With Data. 
The model should drive the data collection, not the other way round and this 
requires the modeller to develop ideas for the model and its parameters from 
a selective perspective of what data types are collected, analysed, 
interpreted and implemented into the model together with a feedback testing 
regime to test the model developed. 
5. Model Building May Feel Like Modelling Through. 
As the model is an attempt to represent part of reality or an action taken or 
to increase understanding, the consideration remains that the model at some 
point becomes the best representation it can be and continued 'muddling' 
with the model can be detrimental to assumptions based on the completed 
model. 
These modelling guides adapted from Pidd' s (1996) work illustrate some key points 
of reference that attempt to maintain consistency when developing, analysing, and 
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implementing models within the realm of modelling of critical infrastructure 
systems. This will assist the modeller in: (1) categorising and developing an 
understanding of the problem context for modelling: (2) deciding the model structure 
based on analysing the available data: (3) model realisation where the parameters of 
the model have been established; (4) the model assessment is the decision point at 
which the model is deemed acceptable, valid and usable as a model of the subject 
system and reflects normal functionality; and, (5) the model implementation where 
working with the model to gain valuable predictive data and likely responses to 
scenario testing. 
7. Conclusion 
The primary assertion of this research is that a model of a critical infrastructure 
system/s can provide a means to identifYing and locating points of risk within the 
model and by extension the physical critical infrastructure system too. 
This research into risk identification takes advantage of the benefits that modelling 
brings in establishing an overview of the subject system and its environment and 
presents a means of depicting a conceptual 'big picture J view. Utilising this 
modelling approach lends itself to incorporation into the security analysis of critical 
infrastructure systems that would potentially lead to the development of a common 
perception and definition of risk and vulnerability, thereby narrowing the sematic 
gap of the identified riskls across differing sectors of the wider critical infrastructure 
realm. The advantage of utilising modelling in this manner would encourage a 
consensus outcome of the level and exposure to the riskls identified in the model and 
by association the physical critical infrastructure system itself. 
Furthermore, modelling risk solutions back into the model enables further analysis 
and testing to determine the likely outcomes before physical implementation of the 
solution into the system itself. Additionally, the development of a critical 
infrastructure system model also provides the opportunity to apply various adverse 
scenarios and conditions to predict system responses to assist further in contingency 
plan development and testing to support the adoption of pre-emptive security 
measures into the physical system. 
The successful enhancement of risk identification and risk perception understanding 
relies heavily on the comprehension and interpretation of the modelling process used 
to represent a particular critical infrastructure system. Therefore, the application of 
the general modelling guidelines outlined delivers a loose structure for the 
development of critical infrastructure models that will lessen the possibility of 
modelling and risk perception biases introduced by the modeller. Furthermore, the 
simple formula for quantifying risk in relation to its magnitude of hazard, the number 
of risks and value of the vulnerability was touched on briefly and delivers a means of 
prioritising risk. Additionally, this now provides a starting point for more in-depth 
future research into applying a value of magnitude to the risk/s and system 
vulnerabilities. 
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This paper seeks to delineate an area of future research that may prove fruitful after 
the initial critical infrastructure system modelling research matures. The intention is 
for future research to progress towards creating computer simulations of the critical 
infrastructure system/s modelled to further enhance the modelling, analysis process 
and understanding of system functionality and response. Once achieved, this will 
then enable analysts to closely replicate the physical system's response in a 
simulation and then test the system simulation with various adverse scenario tests to 
observe the simulated system's responses and reactions. Data and information 
gathered from this analysis process could then be analysed and applied to strengthen 
the physical critical infrastructure system's security and to mitigate risks as 
identified. 
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